The crux of the issue lies in the New Technology Add-on Payment (NTAP) program, a mechanism established by Medicare in 2001 to address a fundamental flaw in its hospital reimbursement system. Under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS), Medicare pays hospitals a flat rate for a patient’s stay based on their diagnosis, known as a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG). While this system encourages efficiency, it can inadvertently discourage the adoption of expensive new technologies. If a groundbreaking new heart valve or robotic surgical tool costs significantly more than the bundled DRG payment covers, hospitals may be financially penalized for using it, potentially stymying patient access to life-saving care.
To mitigate this, the NTAP program allows for supplemental payments to cover up to 75% of the cost of certain high-priced, innovative technologies for a period of two to three years while CMS collects data to eventually fold the cost into the standard DRG. Historically, to qualify for an NTAP, a device had to meet three strict criteria: it had to be "new" (not substantially similar to existing tech), it had to be "costly" (exceeding the standard DRG payment), and it had to demonstrate a "substantial clinical improvement" (SCI) over existing treatments.
The landscape changed in 2021 during the final days of the Trump administration. In an effort to accelerate the "bench-to-bedside" pipeline, CMS implemented a rule that granted a major concession to devices in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Breakthrough Devices Program. Under this policy, any device designated as a "breakthrough" by the FDA was automatically deemed to satisfy the "substantial clinical improvement" criterion for Medicare’s NTAP. For these manufacturers, the regulatory hurdle was lowered significantly; they only had to prove their device was new and expensive to secure the extra Medicare funding.
The FDA’s Breakthrough Devices Program, created by the bipartisan 21st Century Cures Act of 2016, is designed to speed up the development and review of medical devices that provide for more effective treatment or diagnosis of life-threatening or irreversibly debilitating human disease or conditions. To get the designation, a device must represent a breakthrough technology, have no cleared or approved alternatives, or offer significant advantages over existing alternatives. However, the FDA’s standard for "breakthrough" is focused on the potential for effectiveness and the urgency of the need, whereas CMS’s traditional SCI standard requires concrete evidence that the device actually performs better in the real world for the Medicare population.
CMS now argues that this automatic "breakthrough" pass has decoupled payment from proven clinical value. In its latest proposal, the agency expressed concern that it may be overpaying for technologies that, while novel, do not necessarily offer better results for seniors and disabled individuals than the cheaper alternatives already in use. By requiring breakthrough devices to once again prove they provide a "meaningful improvement," CMS aims to restore the integrity of the NTAP program as a reward for true clinical advancement rather than just a subsidy for expensive R&D.

This proposed policy shift highlights the long-standing philosophical and functional tension between the FDA and CMS. The FDA’s mission is to ensure that medical products are safe and effective for their intended use. CMS, however, is tasked with determining whether a product is "reasonable and necessary" for the specific demographics it covers—primarily individuals aged 65 and older. These two standards often clash. A device might be "effective" in a clinical trial composed of 40-year-olds, but CMS may lack evidence that it works as intended in an 80-year-old with multiple comorbidities.
Industry groups, most notably the Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), have voiced strong opposition to the proposal. They argue that the 2021 rule provided much-needed predictability for investors and manufacturers. Developing a breakthrough device is an incredibly risky and capital-intensive endeavor. Proponents of the shortcut argue that if a manufacturer knows they can secure supplemental payments upon FDA clearance, they are more likely to invest in high-risk, high-reward technologies. Removing this certainty, they claim, could lead to a "valley of death" where innovative devices are cleared by the FDA but never reach patients because hospitals cannot afford to stock them.
Furthermore, industry advocates point out that the data required to prove "substantial clinical improvement" often takes years to collect. By the time a manufacturer has the robust, peer-reviewed evidence CMS wants, the two-to-three-year window for NTAP eligibility may have already closed. This creates a "catch-22" where a device needs the NTAP to gain market traction and generate data, but needs the data to get the NTAP.
Conversely, health policy experts and government watchdogs have praised the CMS proposal as a necessary step toward value-based care. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have previously raised questions about the rising costs of supplemental payments and the lack of rigorous oversight regarding the actual benefits of the technologies being funded. Critics of the current system argue that the "breakthrough" label has become a marketing tool that doesn’t always correlate with superior patient care. They point to instances where devices received breakthrough status based on "surrogate endpoints"—such as a change in a lab value—rather than "hard endpoints" like reduced mortality, fewer hospital readmissions, or improved quality of life.
The financial stakes are immense. In the fiscal year 2024 IPPS final rule, CMS estimated that NTAP payments would total hundreds of millions of dollars across dozens of technologies. As the pipeline for digital health, artificial intelligence in diagnostics, and complex implantable devices grows, the potential drain on the Medicare Trust Fund increases. CMS’s move is part of a broader effort to ensure that the "Medicare price" reflects actual "Medicare value."
This proposal also fits into the broader context of the Transitional Coverage for Emerging Technologies (TCET) pathway, a separate but related initiative by CMS. TCET is intended to provide a more structured bridge for breakthrough devices, offering temporary coverage while the manufacturer conducts the specific studies needed to satisfy CMS’s evidence requirements. By revoking the NTAP shortcut, CMS is essentially pushing manufacturers toward the TCET framework, which emphasizes "coverage with evidence development."

The impact of this change would be felt most acutely by small to mid-sized medtech startups. Unlike giants like Medtronic or Abbott, smaller firms often rely on a single breakthrough product. For these companies, the loss of an "automatic" SCI designation could make it harder to secure venture capital funding, as the path to reimbursement becomes longer and more arduous. Investors may pivot toward "safer" incremental improvements to existing devices rather than "moonshot" breakthrough technologies.
However, CMS maintains that the "substantial clinical improvement" standard is not an insurmountable wall, but a necessary filter. To meet the SCI criteria, a device must generally show that it reduces a patient’s length of stay, improves the recovery rate, or provides a device-related improvement that is not available through other means. The agency argues that if a technology is truly a "breakthrough," it should be able to demonstrate these benefits through well-designed clinical trials or high-quality real-world evidence.
As the public comment period for the proposal unfolds, the healthcare sector is bracing for a period of adjustment. If finalized, the rule would require manufacturers to be much more strategic in their clinical trial designs, ensuring they collect data that appeals not just to the FDA’s safety and efficacy standards, but also to CMS’s value-based requirements. It may lead to a surge in post-market surveillance studies and a greater emphasis on health economics and outcomes research (HEOR) early in the product development lifecycle.
Ultimately, the debate over the breakthrough device shortcut is a microcosm of the larger challenge facing modern healthcare: how to pay for the future of medicine without bankrupting the present. CMS’s push for "meaningful improvement" is a clear statement that in the eyes of the nation’s largest payer, innovation for innovation’s sake is no longer enough. The technology must not only be new and different; it must be demonstrably better for the patients who rely on it. As the agency moves to finalize its rules for the coming fiscal year, the medical device industry must prepare for a landscape where the "breakthrough" label is the beginning of the evidentiary journey, not the end of it.

