By Lina Irawan 
Aaron Reitz, who serves as the U.S. Attorney in the Houston-based Southern District of Texas, unequivocally confirmed to Fortune the administration’s intent to revive prize law. This set of rules, deeply rooted in maritime history, permits military forces to seize enemy vessels and their cargo during times of conflict. The implications of such a revival are profound, potentially reshaping the dynamics of naval engagement and international maritime commerce in an era of heightened global tensions.
In a comprehensive statement, Reitz articulated the strategic rationale behind this resurgence: "Our national security interests may require the United States military to seize vessels or cargo supporting the enemy during military conflict. If that happens, our federal courts must be ready to adjudicate the disposition of these captured vessels and cargo." He further clarified the nature of this ancient yet statutory body of law: "Prize law is an ancient body of maritime law—already codified in statute but which we are now reviving—that sets the rules for how seized maritime property is condemned, returned, or disposed of." This statement underscores a proactive effort by the U.S. government to prepare its legal infrastructure for potential future military actions at sea, particularly in the context of confronting adversaries like Iran.
The invocation of prize laws is not merely a legalistic maneuver; it is a potent strategic tool designed to achieve multiple objectives. Primarily, it would enable U.S. forces to significantly bolster any naval blockade of Iran, making the interdiction and confiscation of vessels suspected of carrying Iranian oil or other prohibited goods far more straightforward. Beyond the immediate operational advantage, there’s a clear financial incentive: the sale of seized vessels and their valuable cargo, such as crude oil, could potentially recoup substantial costs associated with military operations and contribute to the U.S. Treasury. This financial aspect aligns with the Trump administration’s broader approach to foreign policy, often seeking to offset the economic burden of international engagements.
The distinction between prize law and conventional civil seizure laws is critical to understanding its potential impact. Civil seizure laws, which are the more commonly employed legal mechanisms today, mandate that the U.S. government identify a specific statutory violation committed by a vessel and establish legal jurisdiction over that violation. This process often entails extensive litigation, requiring warrants, evidentiary burdens, and detailed procedural steps, as highlighted by Michael Frevola, a maritime litigation partner at Holland & Knight LLP. The complexity and time-consuming nature of civil seizure can be a significant impediment in fast-moving military or quasi-military operations.
Prize law, by stark contrast, offers a considerably less complicated legal pathway. It does not require a captor to possess a warrant or to meticulously link a vessel’s seizure to a violation of an existing statute. Instead of relying on law enforcement authorities, such as the Coast Guard, to seize a vessel under civil statutes, prize law empowers the Department of Defense, typically through direct military force, to seize an enemy vessel. This bypasses many of the procedural hurdles inherent in civil law, theoretically allowing for swifter and more decisive action in a conflict zone. The shift in authority from law enforcement to military command also signifies a conceptual move from a policing action to an act of war or quasi-war.
The ‘Ancient’ Roots of U.S. Prize Law: A Historical Perspective
Prize laws are far from a modern invention; their origins can be traced back to the Middle Ages, evolving out of the necessities of naval warfare and privateering. The practice of capturing enemy ships and cargo as "prizes of war" became a recognized custom of international law long before the United States existed. When the American colonies declared independence and formed their own nation, they codified this ancient tradition into their foundational legal documents. The U.S. Constitution, in its Captures Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11), explicitly grants Congress the power "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." This clause, by empowering Congress to regulate "Captures," directly laid the groundwork for the implementation of prize law in the young republic.
During the War of 1812, the United States extensively utilized prize law, enacting the Prize Act of 1812. This legislation provided the detailed framework for adjudicating the legality of seizures made by American naval vessels and privateers against British shipping. The prizes captured during this conflict significantly bolstered the American war effort and enriched many private individuals and the U.S. Treasury.
However, it was during the tumultuous period of the American Civil War that prize law faced its most significant legal test and established a crucial precedent for its modern revival. In 1861, President Abraham Lincoln, without a formal declaration of war by Congress against the Confederate states, ordered a naval blockade of Confederate seaports. This act led to the seizure of numerous vessels attempting to run the blockade. The legality of these seizures was fiercely contested, eventually reaching the Supreme Court in the landmark 1863 case, The Prize Cases. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, ultimately upheld Lincoln’s actions, ruling that a state of "belligerency" or "insurrection" could constitute a de facto war, even in the absence of a formal congressional declaration. This ruling established that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the authority to respond to armed rebellion and engage in acts of war, including blockades and seizures under prize law, without an explicit congressional declaration of war. This precedent is particularly relevant to the current situation with Iran, where a formal declaration of war is absent, but hostilities are ongoing.
The last instance of prize law being invoked by the U.S. was during the Spanish-American War in 1898. In that conflict, the U.S. Navy lawfully detained Spanish vessels as prizes of war, legitimizing their seizure and subsequent disposition under the established legal framework. Following this, the rapid evolution of international law, particularly after the two World Wars and the establishment of the United Nations Charter, which generally prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or with UN Security Council authorization, saw prize law largely fall into disuse. The focus shifted to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict, which often prioritize the protection of civilian property and neutral shipping.
Reitz did not specify whether the Justice Department intends to invoke the Prize Act of 1812, the broader constitutional Captures Clause, or another related statute. However, the clear benefits of prize law’s less complicated legal process for capturing enemy vessels would align with the Trump administration’s preference for decisive action and its "maximum pressure" strategy against Iran. Raymond Waid, a veteran naval officer and maritime lawyer at Liskow and Lewis, underscored the administration’s likely motivation, telling Fortune, "There’s definitely a financial interest in being able to sell the oil and being able to sell the vessel and then just put that money into the coffers of the United States, which is another thing that this administration has shown is a priority." This direct financial recoupment mechanism could serve as both a punitive measure against Iran and a self-funding aspect of the enforcement actions.
Will Prize Law Work in Assisting the U.S. in the Iran Conflict?
Despite the theoretical advantages of reviving prize law, legal experts caution that its actual implementation could be fraught with significant complications. The sheer age of the law and its prolonged dormancy present formidable challenges. Michael Frevola quipped about the lack of contemporary expertise: "It’s not like the DOJ has some really veteran Prize Act litigators on their staff. So we’d have to conduct a séance to wind up getting serious counsel in terms of this." This humorous observation highlights a serious practical problem: the U.S. legal system, from federal courts to the Department of Justice, would need to rapidly re-learn and adapt to a body of law that has been largely ignored for over a century. This could lead to procedural errors, delays, and extensive initial litigation as the legal framework is re-established.
A paramount legal hurdle revolves around the definition of "war" and the authority for capture. For prize law to apply, the U.S. government will need to convincingly prove that a capture takes place during a state of "war" with hostilities that fall within both congressional and presidential authority. This is where The Prize Cases precedent becomes crucial, but also where new challenges arise. Congress has not formally declared war against Iran, which creates a significant legal "grey area." While the U.S. has engaged in military actions and economic warfare against Iran, including deploying military assets and imposing crippling sanctions, whether these constitute a "war" in the sense required for prize law is debatable. The lack of an official war declaration could also draw Congress, which has largely avoided direct involvement in the day-to-day U.S.-Iran dispute, into a more active role, potentially leading to legislative challenges or demands for greater oversight, as suggested by Raymond Waid. The political implications of unilaterally declaring a state of "war" for legal purposes, without congressional consent, could be immense both domestically and internationally.
Furthermore, the revival of prize law in the modern context raises complex questions under international law. While prize law was once a widely accepted custom, its application today must contend with the UN Charter and other international treaties that govern the use of force and the rights of neutral states. Allison Luzwick, a maritime lawyer and Frevola’s colleague at Holland & Knight LLP, pointed out that the U.S. will likely face extensive litigation regarding the legality of any blockade it imposes, and whether it was adequately declared and communicated to the international maritime community. This is particularly sensitive concerning neutral vessels carrying cargo from other states. The doctrine of "continuous voyage," for instance, might be invoked, where cargo destined for an enemy, even if transshipped through a neutral port, could be considered contraband.
Luzwick elaborated on the potential arguments that would arise: "There’s going to be arguments about whether or not that vessel is even subject to the blockade, or if they received notice about the blockade, if they intended to run the blockade." Determining the nationality of the vessel, the ownership of its cargo, and its ultimate destination will be critical. Many tankers operate under "flags of convenience," registered in countries like Panama or Liberia, even if their ultimate beneficial ownership points to Iran. Proving the "enemy" nature of such a vessel or its cargo, particularly when it might be owned by a complex web of shell corporations, will present significant evidentiary challenges. Moreover, if a neutral vessel, unaware of a blockade or genuinely believing it was not subject to it, is seized, it could trigger diplomatic incidents and further legal disputes from the vessel’s flag state or the owners of its cargo.
The sheer logistics of establishing and enforcing a naval blockade and conducting prize court proceedings would be immense. The U.S. Navy would need to dedicate significant resources to interdiction, inspection, and escorting seized vessels to designated ports. Federal courts would need to establish specialized "prize courts" or assign existing judges to these highly specialized cases, which could overwhelm judicial resources. The process of valuation, condemnation, and sale of seized assets would also require establishing new protocols and expertise.
In conclusion, the Trump administration’s decision to revive prize law signals a potent and potentially aggressive new phase in its confrontation with Iran. While offering a theoretically streamlined legal pathway for seizing Iranian oil tankers and recouping costs, this move is fraught with substantial legal, historical, and international complexities. From the practical challenge of re-learning an archaic legal system to the profound questions surrounding the definition of "war" in the absence of a congressional declaration, and the delicate balance of international maritime law concerning neutral shipping, the path ahead is anything but clear. The ultimate effectiveness of this centuries-old tradition in the 21st-century geopolitical landscape remains highly uncertain, promising a new front of legal and diplomatic contention alongside existing military and economic pressures.
